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This thesis argues that the U.S. Navy should attempt to re-establish a presence in 
Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, because Subic Bay offers the best base from 
which to support U.S. Naval forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region.  With the shift 
of defense focus from the European to the Asia-Pacific region, and the current “War on 
Terrorism,” the problem of finding more secure bases for U.S. Naval forward presence 
has increasingly become a problem.  Four main arguments are used to support this thesis: 
The Philippines served as the linchpin of U.S. Naval forward presence for almost a 
century.  Second, the Philippines, especially Subic Bay, offers the best basing 
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region potentially available to the U.S. Navy.  
Alternative options, such as U.S. territory of Guam, the countries of Australia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Mobile Offshore Base, present problems of a 
geographic, political, security, or technical nature.  Third, it will suggest that the strategic 
and political considerations that led to a U.S. departure from the Philippines in 1992 have 
changed with the increasing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
destabilization of Indonesia, and the Islamic insurgency that affects several southern 
islands of the Philippines.  Finally, the benefits of a U.S./Philippine rapprochement far 
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As stated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Asia-Pacific 
region is becoming increasingly important to the United States.  Asia contains a 
concentration of some of the world’s most powerful economies and largest military 
forces, some which are nuclear armed.  The problem from a security standpoint is that the 
enormous size of the region, which covers over fifty percent of the world’s surface and 
contains nearly sixty percent of the world’s population, means that only a large and well-
prepared naval force can police it.  The role of U.S. Naval forward presence has been a 
central part of the National Security Strategy to protect commerce and trade routes, while 
promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.   
Since the removal of forces from the Philippines in 1992, U.S. Naval forward 
presence has been divided between Japan, South Korea, Guam, and in a few other 
countries throughout the Southeast Asian region with whom we have concluded access 
agreements.  In the post-Cold War era, the United States, its allies and friends face new 
challenges throughout the region.  Some analysts perceive that the rise of the People’s 
Republic of China, as an economic and military power will inevitably challenge 
American influence in the region.  This combined with the ongoing tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, Indonesia, and the “War on Terrorism,” creates a 
delicate security situation throughout the Asia-Pacific region that will require an 
increased deployment of U.S. Navy ships to deal with crises as they arise. 
The improvement of relations between the United States and the Philippines has 
opened the door to increased military interaction and cooperation between the two 
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countries.  Therefore, this thesis will argue that now it is clearly time to consider a return 
of the U.S. Navy to Subic Bay, because the political, security and military situation has 
changed for both the United States and the Philippines.  The re-establishment of a naval 
presence in Subic Bay would not be a return to the grand infrastructure of the past.  This 
discussion of how the U.S. Navy might utilize a Philippine base suggests a joint 
U.S./Philippine venture to build and improve the facilities in Subic Bay.  The U.S. Navy 
would require the use of only a small logistical facility currently utilized by the 
commercial ship industry, and the port infrastructure of berths and the airfield already in 
place.  The United States must be forthright and honest about conditions for use and 
agree to pay a fair price for access to the facilities. 
At the current rate, the Navy’s new ship construction program will in the future 
fail to maintain 2001 strength level at about the 318 ships.  Consequently, it is evident 
that there will be a impending short fall in the number of ships the U.S. Navy can deploy 
for missions and operations worldwide, not to mention for an increased role in homeland 
defense that will invariably follow from the events of September 11th 2001.  Of no region 
is this truer than the Asia-Pacific, where distances are great, instability looms, and where 
the fight against terrorism may eventually expand.  A reduced number of ships will still 
be required to steam the same vast distances to reach the Asia-Pacific region and the 
Middle East.  This will lead to manpower strains and increased demands on the navy’s 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of a decreasing and aging fleet.  Therefore, the need for 
additional forward bases and secure logistical facilities will become an increasing 
requirement.  The Philippines offer the best solution to the problem of locating suitable 
sites to establish a forward operating base in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis will argue that, given the evolving political environment in the 
Western Pacific and changing attitudes in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy should attempt 
to re-establish a presence in Subic Bay.  Four main arguments are used to support this 
thesis: First, historically the Philippines have anchored a U.S. Naval forward presence in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  If the past offers a guide to the future, then planners and policy 
makers should be aware of the importance of Subic Bay, and of healthy U.S./Philippine 
relations, to both countries for most of the twentieth century.  Second, the evolving 
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War makes it 
even more crucial that the U.S. Navy find a base to support a forward presence there.  
Problems on the Korean Peninsula, tensions between the People’s Republic of China and 
Taiwan, and disputes over the Spratley and Paracelles Island chains are three of the more 
prominent problems that directly affect U.S. interests in the region.  Third, this thesis will 
argue that the Philippines offers the best of several alternative basing arrangements 
potentially available to the U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific.  Finally, it will suggest that 
the time is right for a U.S./Philippines rapprochement.  Both Washington and Manila 
should be receptive to a return of the U.S. Navy to Subic Bay. 
A. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
As stated in the 2001 QDR Report, the Asia-Pacific region is becoming 
increasingly important to the United States.  The region makes up 35 percent of U.S. 
trade as compared to Europe which makes up only 19 percent.1  As a crossroad between 
East, Southeast, and South Asia, it is home to some of the world’s busiest shipping 
                                                 
 1 “Area of Responsibility,” PACOM Facts, Last Updated 26 JUN 01; accessed on 11 OCT 01; 
available on <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.htm>; Internet. 
1 
routes.  Practically all of the commercial shipping from Europe to the Far East passes 
through the Strait of Malacca, as does oil traveling from the Arabian Gulf to fuel the 
Asian economies.  In addition to the commercial shipping, the Sea Lanes of 
Communication (SLOC) are key for the transit of U.S. Naval forces between the Western 
Pacific and the Indian Ocean and to the Arabian Gulf.  Therefore, Asia-Pacific sea-lanes 
are vital to both the economic well being of the region and to the ability of the U.S. Navy 
to reach distant theaters of operation.2 
Moreover, the region is politically volatile.  Six of the world's largest armed 
forces are located within the Asia-Pacific region: (1) Peoples Republic of China, (2) 
United States, (3) Russia, (4) India, (5) North Korea, and (6) South Korea, not to mention 
Japan which has the largest defense budget among Asian countries and one of the most 
technologically advanced military forces in the region.3  Four, possibly five, of these 
countries possess nuclear arms.  The United States has allies and security partners in the 
region who look to Washington to provide stability there.  The rise of the People’s 
Republic of China as a military power and Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in the South 
China Sea is a worry to many of the smaller states.  Indonesia has appeared to exist on 
the edge of anarchy over the course of the past several years.  Terrorist threats continue to 
destabilize the region, in particular those areas with Islamic populations, to include some 
of the southern islands of the Philippines. 
                                                 
 2 Sokolsky, Richard, Angel Rabassa, and C.R. Neu. The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy 
Toward China. Rand Publication, 2000; accessed on 14 May 01; available on 
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1170/MR1170.pdf>; Internet.; p 10-11. 
 3 “Area of Responsibility,” PACOM Facts, Last Updated 26 JUN 01; accessed on 11 OCT 01; 
available on <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.htm>; Internet. 
2 
B. U.S. NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
The role of U.S. Naval forward presence has been a central part of the National 
Security Strategy to protect commerce and trade routes, while promoting peace and 
security.  The U.S. Navy in the Pacific also stands ready to respond to crises around the 
world.  A forward presence also presents an opportunity to interact with other countries 
and demonstrate a firm commitment by the United States “to defend U.S., allied, and 
friendly interests in this critical region.”4  The problem from a security standpoint is the 
enormous size of the region, which covers over fifty percent of the world’s surface and 
contains nearly sixty percent of the world’s population.  For naval planning purposes, the 
Asia-Pacific region reaches from the west coast of North and South America to the 
western shores of Asia and into the Indian Ocean, and from the Artic in the North on 
down to Antarctica in the South (see figure 1).   
 
Figure 1. U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility 
Source:  USCINCPAC website <http://www.pacom.mil/about/about.htm>. 
 
                                                 
4 “The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998,” DefenseLink 
Publication, Last Updated 25 NOV 98; accessed on 25 NOV01; available on 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf>; Internet. 
3 
Since the removal of forces from the Philippines in 1992, U.S. Naval forward 
presence has been divided between Japan, South Korea, Guam, and in a few other 
countries throughout the Southeast Asian region with whom we have concluded access 
agreements.  At present, only Japan offers a location for a pre-positioned aircraft carrier 
and supporting warships.  However, Japan will not permit the United States to homeport 
a nuclear powered aircraft carrier and Guam does not come without its drawbacks for 
power projection in the region.  As this thesis will argue, other options have too many 
disadvantages, including commercial harbors that, since the October 2001 attack on the 
USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  For all of these reasons, a 
return of the U.S. Navy to Subic Bay offers the best option that will allow the U.S. Navy 
to support national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF U.S. NAVAL FORWARD 
PRESENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND THE 
PHILIPPINES 
The historical relationship that the Untied States shares with the Philippines traces 
its origins to the end of the 19th century.  During this century, the two countries have 
moved from an imperialist to an alliance relationship.  The transition has not always been 
an easy one.  A war with Spain in 1898 brought the United States to the Philippines.  
Economic and geographical arguments were mustered to convince the anti-imperialist 
United States to take up what the English poet Rudyard Kipling called the “White Man’s 
Burden.”5  Many of the arguments used by the United States for remaining in the 
Philippines were self-serving and have left many Filipinos feeling that they were taken 
advantage of.  The main Philippine criticism had been that the large U.S. presence in the 
islands was a violation of Filipino sovereignty.  National resentment focused on the 
largest military bases at Subic Bay and Clarke Air Field.  These bases served as a 
reminder of the colonial ties and what many Filipinos felt to be unfair treaties and 
agreements imposed on Manila by Washington.  America’s backing of President/dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos, who guided the Philippines into financial ruin, was deeply resented, 
especially because Washington’s policy seemed at odds with America’s professed 
democratic ideals. 
A. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION 
When the United States expanded across the continent of North America to settle 
in California, Oregon, and Washington in the mid-19th century, it became a Pacific as 
well as an Atlantic power.  Prior to World War II, the United States deployed forces 
                                                 
5 Kipling, Rudyard, “White Man’s Burden,” McClure, FEB 1899; accessed on 10 DEC 01; available 
on <http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/~benjamin/316kfall/316ktexts/whiteburden.html>; Internet 
5 
overseas for many purposes including the protection of trade routes, deterring and 
punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, cultivating relations with foreign governments and 
defending American citizens and interests overseas during regional disputes.6  Most of 
these same missions remain valid tasks for today’s U.S. Navy. 
The United States proudly claimed that it wanted no part of becoming an 
imperialist power in the manner of several European nations who intervened in the Asia-
Pacific region.  Americans argued for an “Open Door” policy in the Western Pacific, one 
which disavowed “unequal treaties,” extraterritoriality, and European enclaves.  As a 
result of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States became an imperialist 
power in spite of itself with the acquisition of Spanish colonies in the Pacific and the 
Caribbean.  The Philippines, together with Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, fell under 
control of the United States largely out of reactive fear that another nation would move in 
and take over the vulnerable islands.7  President McKinley did not easily decide to 
maintain a U.S. presence in the Philippines.  In fact, his administration did not have any 
idea how to dispose of the acquired Spanish colonies.8  Washington decided to retain 
possession of the Philippines after many predicted that, if the Untied States left, then it 
would most likely be taken over by Japan, Germany or a returning Spain.9 
B. U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS 
When the United States took possession of the Spanish colonies in 1898, it had no 
intention of maintaining the Philippines indefinitely.  Washington planned to build up the 
Filipino government into a working democracy as a prelude to independence and 
                                                 
6 Yost, David S., “The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,” JFQ, Summer 1995; p 72. 
7 Dudden, Arthur P., The American Pacific, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; p 82-87. 
8 Karnow, Stanley, In Our Image, New York: Random House, Inc, 1989; p 106-10. 
9 Karnow, Ibid., p 128-130. 
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eventual self-rule.  This vision differed from that of the European colonial powers in the 
region as well as with that of Japan, that saw colonies as sources of raw materials to feed 
homeland economies.  The United States had seemingly unlimited resources at home and 
was able to limit American exploitation of the Philippines by its corporations and 
individuals.  Yet, the United States did force unfair trade agreements on the Philippines 
that made them dependent on American goods.10 
Throughout this period of American rule, Filipinos maintained the desire to be an 
independent nation free from colonial rule.  Many, in fact, fought the U.S. takeover 
during the Filipino insurgency (1899-1902).  In 1934, the United States Congress passed 
the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which promised to make the Philippine Islands an 
independent nation in 1944, following a 10-year period to allow the government time to 
mature.11  During World War II, Philippine forces fought along side Americans to fulfill 
MacArthur’s vow to return and liberate the Philippines.  Following the war in accordance 
with the original act, on July 4th, 1946 the Philippines finally raised its own flag as an 
independent nation. 
An independent Philippines entered into a series of agreements and treaties with 
the United States.  The 1947 U.S.-Philippines Military Base Agreement (MBA) 
authorized the United States to maintain bases in the Philippines for ninety-nine years.12  
These pacts created a “neocolonial” relationship that Filipino nationalists denounced as a 
continued infringement of Philippine sovereignty by the Americans.  With the onset of 
                                                 
10 Karnow, Ibid., p 12-13. 
11 Gregor, A. James and Virgilio Aganon, The Philippine bases, Lanham, Maryland: University Press 
of America, 1987; p 6. 
12 Buss, Claude A., Cory Aquino and the People of the Philippines, Stanford California: The Portable 
Stanford, 1987; p 143-145. 
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the Cold War, the presence of the U.S. military bases brought the Philippines’ interests, 
by default, into line with those of the United States.  Although now out from under 
American colonial rule, the Philippines understood from its experience with Japanese 
occupation that it needed the protection of the United States.  The United States, in turn, 
realized that its military presence would serve as a stabilizing power in the region.13  The 
United States was able to dictate the negotiations for the base agreements by threatening 
to locate them elsewhere in the region, either on the islands of Okinawa or Guam.  
Therefore, Philippine leaders had to back off their nationalistic ideals and acquiesce to 
terms dictated by the United States.  These terms included U.S. legal jurisdiction over all 
American military personnel and over Filipinos who worked on U.S. bases, in effect a 
revival of “extraterritoriality” and “enclaves” denounced by Washington in the past.  
Also, many Filipinos noted that the Philippines, a former colony and ally, received far 
less aid and support from the United States than did Japan, the common former enemy of 
World War II.14  
The American support of the Philippine President/dictator Ferdinand Marcos 
(1965-1986) created additional feelings of Filipino resentment towards the United States.  
Marcos left the Philippines in a shambles by destroying the industrial and economic base 
with rampant corruption and cronyism, all the while embezzling millions of dollars from 
the country.  Marcos left the Philippines virtually bankrupt.  The Armed Forces of the 
Philippines courted unpopularity by supporting Marcos’ unjust policies and protecting the 
Marcos family.15 
                                                 
13 Karnow, op. cit., p 330-331. 
14 Karnow, op. cit., p 332. 
15 Buss, op. cit., p 87-90. 
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Despite corruption and misrule, Marcos was seen in Washington as an essential 
ally.  President Lyndon Johnson described Marcos as “my right arm in Asia,” while 
President Ronald Reagan called him an “old friend.” The Vietnam War raised the fear of 
the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia.  Marcos skillfully leveraged this 
fear to gain large amounts of economic aid from the United States.  President Johnson 
needed support from an Asian country, and Marcos was willing to give it so long as the 
United States footed the bill.  Marcos used the fear of communism to gain United States 
support to fight the communist rebels and prevent the overthrow of “democracy” in the 
Philippines. This fear was especially acute after the fall of Saigon and the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam.  Marcos cast his spell on the future President Ronald Reagan 
from 1969 when Reagan was President Richard Nixon’s personal representative to the 
Philippines.  Marcos invited Nixon to the inaugural concert at the Philippine Cultural 
Center in Manila, and impressed him with lavish banquets and hospitality that Reagan 
never forgot.16 
Even when Marcos was finally ousted from power, he was spirited out of the 
country on a U.S. Air Force transport to Hawaii, were he eventually died.  Reagan found 
it hard to denounce Marcos and endorse his successor Cory Aquino until he finally 
became convinced that there was no alternative to Marcos’ removal from power.  As the 
transition to a democracy was taking place in the Philippines, the Aquino government had 
delicately to balance nationalistic sentiment with much needed support from the United 
States.  The most contentious issue dividing the two countries would continue to be that 
of the status of the U.S. military bases on Philippine soil.17 
                                                 
16 Karnow, op. cit., p 376-377. 
17 Buss, op. cit., p 163-170. 
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C. ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINE BASES IN THE REGION 
In the early part of the twentieth century, the American naval presence in the 
Philippines was seen as a balance and stop gap measure against the rising aggression of 
Japan in the Pacific.18  The U.S. Navy’s attempts to develop Subic Bay into a modern 
naval base were thwarted by Congress in 1908.  Because of the Washington Naval 
treaties that followed World War I, Philippine bases were never fortified.  Therefore, in 
1941 at the onset of the Second World War, the Japanese were able to easily defeat the 
smaller, strategically exposed U.S. and Philippine forces.  Following World War II, the 
Philippines now an independent country, fell under the U.S. umbrella of protection.  The 
United States found it important to maintain naval bases in the Philippines as Cold War 
tensions firmed up a U.S. Containment Strategy.  During the Korean War (1950-1953), 
the Philippines served as a stepping-stone to the battlefield.  In the 1960s and ‘70s, the 
bases served as a staging area, logistical base, and popular rest and relaxation point for 
the United States forces during the Vietnam War.  During the height of the operations in 
Vietnam, Subic Bay witnessed an average of over 200 ship visits a month with an 
average 30 ships a day in port.   
Following South Vietnam’s collapse in 1975, the fear of the spread of 
communism throughout Southeast Asia brought the Philippines strategically to the 
forefront.  The U.S. naval forward presence in the Philippines became a major element in 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) that include freedom of navigation through 
critical Pacific SLOCs, peacekeeping operations and enforcing embargoes.  In November 
1978, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Vietnam.  The Soviets provided the 
Vietnamese with economic assistance in return for access to port facilities at Cam Ranh 
                                                 
18 Gregor, op. cit., p 3. 
10 
Bay.  This extended the Soviet Navy’s reach right into the heart of the South China Sea 
and the Indian Ocean.  Vital shipping lanes upon which the world’s economy depended 
were now under a potential threat by the Soviet naval presence.  During the 1991 Gulf 
War, Subic Bay served as the staging ground and transit point for the largest U.S. military 
operation since the Vietnam War. 
D. REASON THE UNITED STATES LEFT IN 1992 
In 1989, the Cold War ended and left the United States as the world’s sole 
superpower in the world.  This change brought the perceived need for a phased reduction 
of U.S. Naval forces.  The eruption of Mount Pinatubo and the rejection of a negotiated 
10-year lease agreement for the continued use of the Subic Bay Naval Base in 1991 
marked the beginning of an end to the United States Naval presence in the Philippines.  
The Philippine Senate rejected the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security in 
1991 that would have extended the U.S. Naval bases agreement for another ten years.  
This came at a time of political turmoil in the Philippines when the nationalist movement 
to remove U.S. military bases was at its peak.  Several factors played into the rejection of 
the base agreement and removal of U.S. forces from the Philippines.  Filipinos believed 
that the Philippines was never given the same respect by the United States as other 
countries such as Japan and those in Europe.  Nor did many Filipinos consider 
themselves to be completely independent so long as the Americans continued to occupy 
bases in their country. 
11 
Since the signing of the original MBA in 1947, Philippine nationalists had worked 
to remove the United States bases from their country.  The Philippine people resented the 
nearly century-long presence of the United States in their country and the continuing 
support for the Marcos “dictatorship.”  These two factors contributed to the eventual 
rejection by the Philippine Senate of the base renewal agreement in September 1991.  
After several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a more prolonged schedule of departure, 
the U.S Navy finally withdrew its remaining personnel in November 1992. 
12 
III. EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
A. SHIFT OF FOCUS FROM EUROPE TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
The 2001 QDR states “Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to 
large-scale military competition.”19  This potential for military competition has become 
acute, and arguably more devastating, because of significant economic development in 
the Asia-Pacific region over the past two decades.  This economic growth has been 
accompanied by the heightened possibility of an arms race in the region.20  The shift of 
defense focus by the United States from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, the anticipated 
rise of China as an economic and military power, combined with the volatile instability in 
the Asia-Pacific region (Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula, and Indonesia), and fallout 
from the U.S. led “War on Terrorism,” mean that defense missions of the U.S. military 
are likely to grow.  This will put increasing strain on America’s forward presence 
posture.  The problem of maintaining assured access to regional waters and finding bases 
to support U.S. naval forward presence is already a preoccupation for U.S. military 
planners. 
The non-transparency of China’s policy toward the region, combined with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) current state of instability, one fueled 
by a weak economic performance among a number of its members, has added to the 
volatility of the region.  Indonesia, seen a leader within ASEAN, is again experiencing 
major political disorder in the wake of the impeachment of its president (Abdurrahman 
Wahid) on July 2001, and the election of a new regime.  The addition of less-developed 
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countries, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, to the membership of ASEAN 
has also weakened the fabric of an already diverse group that will find it even more 
difficult in the future to make collective security decisions.21  Attempts to create a 
successful multilateral security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region have floundered.  
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has so far been unable to create a cohesive and 
functional working group.  This failure stems from the fact that the region is, in the 
opinion of Southeast Asian specialist Desmond Ball, “too large and diverse, in terms of 
the sizes, strengths, cultures, interests, and threat perceptions of its constituent states, to 
support any meaningful region wide security architecture.”22  The ARF has produced a 
few initial resolutions, such as the “Declaration on the South China Sea.”  Yet this is only 
a bland statement of multilateral cooperation that fails to address head-on the overarching 
issue of regional cohesion and enforcement.  ASEAN’s inability to transform itself into 
an effective regional actor can be attributed in large part to its brittle foundation 
composed of the different types of political systems.  This has meant that there is no basis 
for solidarity, no feeling of common interests, no ideological “glue” that can foster a 
sense of solidarity among the ASEAN states.23 
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B. TENSIONS IN THE REGION 
1. Rise of China 
In addition to being the most populated country in the world, China has 
experienced a high level of economic growth for the past fifteen years.  Some analysts 
suggest China is projected to become the world’s leading economy by the year 2020.24  
This economic development has allowed China to embark on an increase in military 
spending calculated to realize Beijing’s aspirations to become the leading power in the 
Asian-Pacific region.  Since the end of the Cold War and the removal of U.S. forces from 
the Philippines, China, in the view of many American analysts, has set out to become a 
regional hegemon.  China desires to weaken the influence and presence of the United 
States in the Asia-Pacific region in order to assert its own.25 
“As China becomes economically and militarily stronger, it will seek to be treated 
with greater deference by its less powerful neighbors,” RAND researcher Zalmay 
Khalilzad predicts.26  China will continue to make its case to regional countries that the 
United States is heir to the old Western imperialists powers whose only interest is to 
exploit the region for its own benefit.  If Chinese leaders can encourage other regional 
countries to form a stronger Asian partnership under Beijing’s leadership and thus draw 
support away from the United States, then American military influence in the region 
could be seriously undermined.27  This summer a pact signed by China and Russia, 
together with four other countries of the Central Asia region, called the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), aimed to create an economic and security forum to 
target terrorism and Islamic extremism.28  The SCO can be seen as a first successful step 
in realizing the greater long-term goals of the Chinese leaders.   
Although the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States have 
forged new alliances and coalitions throughout the world and even brought together the 
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United States and China with the common purpose of fighting terrorism, significant 
issues continue to divide Washington and Beijing.  At present, Beijing has helped in the 
effort by giving verbal support and sharing intelligence with the United States.  China, 
along with Russia, is seen as supporting the coalition due in large part to their own 
Islamic extremist concerns in the same region of Central Asia.29  However, the SCO 
security mechanism has also taken a common stance against the proposed U.S. missile 
defense plans.  China is attempting to seize the opportunity to extract concessions from 
the United States over issues such as Taiwan, missile defense, and separatists’ 
movements in Xinjiang and Tibet.30  Therefore, the changing U.S./China relations are at 
a crossroads “beyond the knowledge of the best trained experts.”31  Even thought the 
U.S/ China interests converge in the “War on Terrorism,” the two countries remain 
seriously divided over the future of Taiwan and U.S. missile defense plans. 
2. China-Taiwan 
The China-Taiwan conflict is at the forefront of U.S. regional concerns.  The 
Taiwan Strait has, three times in the past, been the scene of serious military 
confrontations between the PRC and the United States.  “Reunification” of Taiwan with 
Mainland China is Beijing’s key objective, one that will increase the PRC’s legitimacy in 
the eyes of its own people, demonstrate the hollowness of the U.S. Naval forward 
presence, and thus become a stepping-stone to China’s ambition to regional hegemony in 
Asia.  Beijing’s goal of “reunification” was made clear during Jiang Zemin’s address 
celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 
1st 2001.    
The status of Taiwan as a part of China shall in no way be allowed to 
change.  The Chinese Communists are rock firm in their resolve to 
safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity.  While we do have the 
greatest sincerity to work for a peaceful reunification, we cannot and will 
not undertake to renounce the use of force.32 
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32 Berry, Nicholas,  “China Travels a New Road,” Center for Defense Information, 21 AUG 01; 
Current U.S. policy as defined in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 recognizes 
“One China,” and supports a peaceful unification of China and Taiwan.  There is an 
unambiguous interest in the commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by the 
United States, and Washington maintains close ties to Taipei.  But, Washington will not 
support a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. 
Beijing believes that Washington’s strategy is to “encircle” China with a U.S. led 
security alliance that includes Australia, Japan, and South Korea.33  This view was 
reinforced by the July 2001 Australia-U.S. Ministerial meeting in Canberra, when the 
subject of creating a multilateral organization, that would include the United States, 
Australia, Japan, and South Korea, “to come together and talk more often.”34  Continued 
support of the United States for the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in the form of 
arms sales (the April 2001 package include Kidd class destroyers, diesel submarines, and 
surveillance aircraft) are seen as a major obstacle to China’s efforts to “reunify” Taiwan 
with the motherland.  This has further poisoned relations between the two countries.35  If 
this were not enough, the collision of the Navy EP-3 with a Chinese interceptor, and 
President Bush’s April 2001 promise to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, 
followed by the Taiwan President’s visit to the United States in May 2001, have 
combined to create an uneasy relationship between Washington and Beijing.  Regional 
countries in Asia are carefully monitoring the Taiwan issue and U.S. reactions.  If China 
were once again to attempt to intimidate Taiwan, and the United States failed to come to 
Tapei’s rescue, this would be seen as a sure sign of Washington’s unwillingness to 
confront China over Taiwan.  Asian countries would naturally begin to doubt U.S. 
willingness to support them against an emerging Chinese threat.36 
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3. Korean Peninsula 
The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most volatile spots in East Asia as the 
governments from both the North and South see themselves as the rightful leaders of a 
unified Korea.  The security situation on the peninsula has exhibited considerable 
continuity for over fifty years since the end of the Korean War.  Nevertheless, the 
economic decline of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the 
apparent willingness of the communist regime to develop nuclear weapons continues to 
be an important unresolved issue. 
Advances toward resolution of these issues made during the Clinton 
Administration have not been immediately followed up and further developed by the 
Bush administration.  The Bush administration has had little success in forging ahead in 
talks with the North Korean government due mainly to the fact that President Bush is on 
record as distrusting North Korean motives.37  The economically weak North Korean 
government has used the threat of weapons proliferation to gouge financial aid out of 
Washington.38  In testimony given on April 17, 2001, Deputy CIA Director John 
McLaughlin warned that North Korea challenges the stability in the Asian region in two 
ways.  First is Pyongyang’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-
range missiles and its willingness to sell them to other rogue regimes.  Second, is the 
economic and humanitarian disaster that threatens to implode the North Korean regime.39  
In November 2001, Washington called for an inspection of North Korea’s suspected 
production of WMD, and also “threatened to take unspecified ‘necessary 
countermeasures’” if Pyongyang did not comply.40 
The North Korean government states that they have “frozen their nuclear power 
industry” as agreed to in the DPRK-US Agreed Framework of 1994.  Nevertheless, the 
United States is well aware that fully half of North Korea’s budget is devoted to military 
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spending, while Pyongyang continues to develop and export ballistic missiles.  Inter-
Korean summit meetings have sought to reduce tensions on the peninsula through trade, 
cross border visits and letter exchanges between separated families.  An agreement to de-
mine an area of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and connect a railway between the two 
countries was hammered out, although implementation remains problematic.  Ministerial 
level meetings between the two Korean governments held in 2001 have met with little 
success.  In fact, there has been a definite regression with the nullification of prior 
agreements on family reunions.41 
4. South China Sea 
The South China Sea lies in the heart of Southeast Asia and is a strategic area 
because it contains two of the world’s most important SLOCs connecting the Middle 
East, East Asia, Australia, and Northeast Asia.  It is also potentially rich in resources, 
particularly oil.  Any significant tensions over rival territorial claims could adversely 
affect the military balance in the region, and have a destabilizing effect on global 
economies.  Southeast Asian countries do not want to witness the spread of Chinese 
influence in the region, especially in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis that has left a 
number of countries economically, politically, and militarily weakened. 
The Chinese advance territorial claims in the South China Sea that extend to 
almost the entire area, including the Spratley and Parcell Islands.  Previously, Chinese 
claims only had to counter those of Vietnam in the Spratleys and Paracelles.  Yet, in 
February 1995, Manila discovered that China’s military had occupied Mischief Reef, an 
islet within the claimed waters of the Philippines.  China has also built up its military 
forces in other areas of the South China Sea.42  Currently, Chinese claims to portions of 
the South China Sea overlap all -- or in part -- with those of Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines.43 
5. The War against Terrorism and its Effects in the Region 
The September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States placed Afghanistan in 
Washington’s cross-hairs because the Taliban government stood accused of harboring the 
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terrorist Osama bin Laden and of supporting his activities.  Currently, responsibility for 
Afghanistan falls under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), while Diego Garcia, a 
key logistical location for the operations against Afghanistan, is located within U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM) jurisdiction.  Indeed, a majority of the forward deployed 
U.S. naval forces used in the operations against Afghanistan come from PACOM.  
Afghanistan operations, combined with the continued requirement to support sanctions 
against Iraq, have left U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region thinly spread. 
Bin Laden has made several pleas for Muslims worldwide to join a Holy War 
against the United States and its supporting coalition.  Networks that support Al Qaeda 
Islamic radicals with funds reach deep into the Southeast Asian region.  The region is 
home to many religions other than Islam, including Christianity, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism.  However, Islamic influence is strongest in areas stretching from southern 
Thailand, through Malaya, into a great portion of Indonesia and the southern Philippines.  
These areas are most vulnerable to destabilization by Islamic fundamentalists.  Fear of a 
popular backlash has caused leaders from Indonesia and Malaysia, both predominately 
Muslim countries, to criticize the military strikes by the United States against 
Afghanistan. 
a. India-Pakistan 
The South Asia region is another link between the Middle East and the 
rest of the Asia.  The height of tensions in this part of Asia involves the ongoing dispute 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.  Because both countries have nuclear 
weapons, this confrontation makes South Asia one of the most dangerous places in the 
world.44  At present, the United States is walking a fine line between maintaining the 
support of Pakistan as an access and launching point into Afghanistan, while trying to 
cultivate improved relations with India, which is perceived as the major emerging force 
in the South Asian region. 
In addition to conflicts with Pakistan, India is also concerned about 
Chinese attempts to gain access to ports in Myanmar, as well as close links and military 
technology transfers between the PRC and Pakistan.  Pakistani President Pervez 
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Musharraf attempts to strike a balance between the support given by Pakistan to the U.S.-
led “War on Terrorism” and the Islamic protests from within his own country against 
U.S. bombing.  Popular support for the Taliban regime, especially in Pashtun areas of 
Pakistan, remains strong. 
b. Indonesia 
Once seen as a leader of ASEAN, Indonesia’s leadership has faltered, as 
the country has become prey to political, economic, and territorial instability.  Although it 
is the world’s most populous Muslim country, Indonesia is faced with partial 
fragmentation, as the example of East Timor has proved contagious to autonomy 
movements in Irian Jaya and Aceh provinces.45 
The Asian economic crisis, which devastated the Indonesian economy, 
also encouraged the political instability that led to the ouster of longtime leader Suharto 
in May 1998.  The economic downturn also fueled the ethnic confrontations that caused 
many ethnic Chinese businesses to flee the country and that have dampened 
reinvestment.  The leaders who have followed Suharto have done little to stabilize 
Indonesia’s political situation, which continues to fester due to continued corruption and 
agitation by those with lingering ties to Suharto’s regime.46  The current president, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, has promised sweeping institutional changes and a return to 
political and economical stability.  However, those bright promises have encountered 
bureaucratic roadblocks and a lack of political will. 
The conservative Megawati was ineffective in dealing with fallout over 
the September 11th events.  Washington became annoyed by Jakarta’s tardiness in 
condemning the attacks and its tolerance, not to say encouragement, of anti-American 
protests at home. In Indonesia, she is at odds with Muslim and political leaders who see 
her as overly supportive of Washington’s “War on Terrorism.”47  In order to give herself 
political cover after initially supporting Washington’s campaign, Megawati, as well as 
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Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, has since condemned the U.S. strikes 
against Afghanistan.  But such back talking has failed to appease the large Muslim 
population at home while she has spent much needed political clout that is needed to push 
forward economic reforms.  So far, anti-American Demonstrations in Indonesia have 
remained limited.  But if the campaign drags on, as is forecast, and if economic instability 
continues, Islamic radicals may gain momentum in their campaign to recruit the poor, 
and may yet become a force to be reckoned with in Indonesia.48  There is also an 
overriding concern in Washington that Indonesia may become a base for international 
terrorists who can move easily among Indonesia’s many islands.  Admiral Dennis Blair, 
USCINCPAC, conveyed this concern during a visit to Indonesia in November 2001 to 
discuss security matters with his counterparts there.49 
c. Philippine Islands 
The Philippines is a predominately Christian country long challenged by 
Islamic factions in the southern islands.  During the Afghan War against the Soviet Union 
in the 1980s, more than 1,000 Philippine Muslim fighters, many allegedly recruited by 
the CIA, volunteered to fight in Afghanistan.50  Inspired by this experience, many 
Filipino Muslims returned and joined the efforts of other Islamic groups in the southern 
Philippines to create a separate Islamic state.   
In 1991, hard-line Islamic fundamentalist Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani 
created an organization called Abu Sayyaf, a splinter from the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF).51  Abu Sayyaf is thought to have received training and money from the 
Al Qaeda network, and even a visit by Osama bin Laden.  Islamic fundamentalists from 
Indonesia and Malaysia have been trained on southern Philippines islands, part of a 
conspiracy to create a network of Islamic extremists that extend throughout the region.  
The Abu Sayyaf has carried out bombings, killings, and a number of kidnap for ransom 
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operations.  The money gained from the abductions has enabled the group to obtain 
advanced weapons and equipment that has increased its ability to resist counter-
insurgency operating by the less well-equipped Philippine military.52  The United States 
lists Abu Sayyaf as one of the terrorist groups associated with bin Laden’s al Qaeda 
network. 
Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was among the first leaders 
in the region to condemn the September 11th attacks and remains one of the United 
States’ most supportive allies in the war on terrorism.  Almost immediately following the 
September 11th attacks, Arroyo authorized the U.S. military to utilize the former 
American facilities at Clark and Subic Bay for transit and refueling operations.  Military 
advisors from the United States traveled to the Philippines in November 2001 to observe 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) operate while in pursuit of the Abu Sayyaf.  
During President Arroyo’s November 2001 visit to the United States, she met with 
President Bush to reinforce the pledge of support and also gained much needed economic 
and military aid for the Philippines.  There is still plenty of nationalistic rhetoric to 
challenge the increased interaction between the United States and the Philippines that is 
held over from the pre-1992 bases era.53   
C. FUTURE FLEET LEVELS AND U.S. NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN 
THE REGION 
Long gone are the days of the 600-ship navy concept of the Reagan-Cold War era, 
that included fifteen aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG) and four battleship battle 
groups centered around the revival of the Iowa class battleships.  The current post-Cold 
War fleet has leveled out at about 318 ships, with 12 CVBGs and approximately 116 
surface warships, as mandated by the 1997 QDR.54  But, the Navy’s new ship 
construction fails to maintain current strength levels, which will put further strains on an 
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already over-stretched infrastructure as demands on the Navy increase.  Of no region is 
this truer than the Asia-Pacific, where distances are great, instability looms, and where 
the fight against terrorism may eventually expand.  The demand for the navy to increase 
the OPTEMPO of a decreasing and aging fleet will mount. 
In the 1980s, the fleet level of the U.S. Navy peaked at approximately 550 ships, 
as the end of the Cold War and the draw down of U.S. military forces meant that the goal 
of Reagan’s 600-ship navy was never attained.  The Navy struggled to find the optimum 
number of ships that should make up the fleet in the absence of another super power and  
peer competitor.  During the post-Cold War draw down, or “right sizing” as some 
proclaimed, a great number of ships were decommissioned and many navy personnel 
were separated in an attempt to reduce manning and adjust to a smaller defense budget.  
As the United States became the sole super power, and the roles and missions of the 
Navy adjusted to a post-Cold War environment, a shrinking fleet experienced an 
increased OPTEMPO to meet forward presence demands.  The Navy was called upon to 
maintain a continuous CVBG presence in the Arabian Gulf (which continues to this day) 
and to enforce U.N. sanctions on Iraq following the Gulf War in 1991.  In addition to the 
presence in the Middle East, the Navy has also participated in and responded to a great 
number of operations and missions around the globe.  These include places such as the 
Somalia, the Balkans, the Taiwan Strait, East Timor, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and 
Haiti. 
At present, the war on terrorism and operations against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, a land locked country, has placed a significant new demand on naval 
resources.  Three CVs now are assigned to the Middle East region, and CENTCOM has 
24 
requested a forth.  The fight against terrorism is not expected to lead to a short, quick 
campaign similar to the Gulf War.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that 
“We are fighting a new kind of war…Many things about this war are different from wars 
past but, as I have said, one of those differences is not the possibility of instant victory.”55  
The shipbuilding plan and report to Congress indicated that the procurement rate and ship 
mix to maintain the current size of the fleet falls short of its target for the third straight 
year.  The budgets for Fiscal Year (FY) 2000-2002 have provided the funds to produce 
six ships a year.56  In order to maintain the fleet level at about 300-plus ships, the 
shipbuilding program would need to fund nine ships this year and every year for the 
foreseeable future.  Continuing on the trend of six ships a year will lead to a fleet of about 
230 ships.57  The Navy has announced a change to the Future Surface Combatant 
Program58 that will delay it for one year.  Current plans call for the rapid 
decommissioning of the remaining DD-963 Spruance class destroyers.  The combination 
of these measures will reduce the size of the fleet to approximately 286 ships by 2007.59 
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It is evident that there will be a forthcoming short fall in the number of ships in 
the U.S. Navy to respond to missions and operations worldwide, not to mention an 
increased role in homeland defense, that will invariably follow from the events of 
September 11th 2001.  A reduced number of ships will be required to steam the same vast 
distances to reach the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East.  This will lead to 
manpower strains.  Therefore the need for additional forward based and secure logistical 
facilities will become an increasing requirement if U.S. Navy forward presence is to 
retain even its current level of effectiveness. 
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IV. A RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 
It has now been almost a decade since U.S. Naval forces left Subic Bay, officially 
turning the base over to the Philippine government in November 1992.  The catch phrase 
used to justify the pullout at this time was “places not bases.”60  This meant that, 
although the United States Navy would continue to maintain ships on station, we 
intended to reduce the overseas infrastructure by eliminating the largest naval facility 
outside of the United States.  At that time, the abandonment of Subic Bay was seen as a 
logical part of the post-Cold War draw down.  Unfortunately, the post-Cold War era has 
witnessed an increase in the missions of the U.S. Pacific Naval forces.  Of no time has 
this been truer than immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the 
inauguration of the “War on Terrorism.”  Furthermore, the increase in missions coincides 
with a decrease in fleet size, with further ship reductions on the horizon.  In this “post 
bases” era, the navy has had to rely on a series of access agreements and the use of 
foreign facilities throughout the Southeast Asian region in order to make up for the loss 
of Subic Bay.  Currently, force protection measures for forward deployed ships require 
that port facilities possess safe and secure access to logistical support, as well as rest and 
relaxation opportunities for crews.  In an area of growing political turmoil, Subic Bay 
offers a base that is both logistically adequate and as physically secure as any potential 
base in the Asia-Pacific region.  These considerations suggest strongly that now is the 
time to revive U.S. Naval interaction with the Philippines to create a mature bilateral 
relationship. 
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A. THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A MATURE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP  
The United States and the Philippines are compatible partners for reasons both 
political and geographic.  The Philippines is a mutual defense treaty partner and a long-
time ally of the United States.  There has been a marked improvement in the relations 
between the governments of the two countries over the course of the past five years, one 
that has led to the signing of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and resumption of 
bilateral exercises and training between the navies of the two countries.  Both countries 
are actively engaged in a mutually assisting the campaign to combat terrorism.  In July 
2001, Philippine President Arroyo and her administration floated the idea of reconverting 
a part of Subic Bay into a naval base and invite “foreign militaries” to hire out and utilize 
the port facilities.  The only “foreign military” expected to take advantage of this offer is 
that of the United States.61   
Subic Bay’s location and assets, deemed superfluous in 1992, have become far 
more attractive at the dawn of the 21st century.  The Philippines lies along the SLOCs 
between the United States and Asia, and running North/South through the South China 
Sea.  For this reason, General Douglas MacArthur called the Philippines “the key that 
unlocks the door to Asia.”62  Subic Bay is a natural deep-water harbor, naturally sheltered 
from typhoons because of the mountain ranges that surround it.  The port has many 
shipyard facilities already in place that are under utilized.  During the Cold War, Subic 
Bay provided “one-stop shopping” whereby U.S. ships, and entire CVBGs, could get 
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everything from supplies to parts, and receive repairs.  Subic Bay also has the capability 
to land aircraft at the former Naval Air Station (NAS) Cubi Point, and taxi to pierside. 
B. THE RE-CONVERSION OF SUBIC BAY  
Recreating a U.S. Naval presence in the Philippines should in no way mean a 
return to the large base infrastructure of the past.  On the contrary, the U.S. Navy would 
require the use of only a small logistical facility currently utilized by the commercial ship 
industry, and the port infrastructure of berths and the airfield already in place.  As the 
Philippine government has opened the door to the idea of a return of warships to Subic 
Bay, the U.S. Navy should gradually step up the frequency of port calls, while expanding 
opportunities to interact with and participate in military exercises with the Philippine 
Navy.  The facilities in Subic Bay should remain under the jurisdiction of the Philippine 
government to avoid a revival of the nationalistic resentment against U.S. naval presence 
that drove the Americans out a decade ago.  Needless to say, the U.S. government should 
pay a fair price for the use of Subic Bay amenities. 
There is no requirement for the U.S. Navy to acquire a base in the Philippines and 
the costs associated with running and maintaining it.63  The acquisition of a facility by 
the U.S. Navy in Subic Bay should be based on U.S./Philippine commercial and military 
partnerships.  This idea is being considered by the Filipino leadership as a way to pay for 
the much needed modernization program of the AFP.64  In July 2001, Admiral Blair 
assured the Philippine people that the United States does not seek to establish a 
permanent base in Subic Bay, but instead seeks “flexible arrangements” in order to 
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establish a working relationship to meet the future challenges of security in the Asia-
Pacific region.65 
A commercial military arrangement would greatly benefit both countries.  A 
commercial infrastructure will provide a means of developing the relatively underutilized 
facilities in Subic Bay that include: “transportation facilities (an airport, berths and 
internal road network), large fuel storage, public utilities (power plants, electricity, water 
and sewerage systems), buildings for warehousing, offices, accommodations for 
transients, sports and medical facilities, and residential pockets with their concomitant 
community facilities such as schools, shopping and commercial centers.”66  These 
facilities can be owned and operated by Philippine companies or some other form of 
commercial investment strategy, providing the economic boost to the country and 
alleviating the U.S. Navy’s budget of the requirement to support a large base 
infrastructure.  If the intent of the Philippine government is to create a naval facility to 
maintain ships, then the Philippine Navy should be located there to make it a Philippine 
base, and not an American one.  A Philippine Naval facility in Subic Bay would provide 
secure access to U.S. Navy ships as well as increase U.S.-Philippine naval interaction. 
In the future, as relations improve, the possibility of U.S. support ships, pre-
positioning ships, and even a surface action group (SAG) may be located in Subic Bay to 
help alleviate the heightened OPTEMPO made necessary by decreasing fleet size as well 
as the rising cost of fuel.  A logistical facility in the Philippines will give the supply and 
pre-positioning ships another location from which to work.  Since 1993, the U.S. Army 
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and the Marine Corps have embarked on a plan to increase the number of pre-positioning 
ships.  However, the over-riding impediment to the realization of this goal has been the 
limited number of ports in which to locate them.  Diego Garcia is handicapped both by a 
limited number of anchorages and by the fact that ships stocked with ammunition must be 
spaced further apart for safety purposes. 
The benefits of Subic Bay as a base for U.S. Navy deployed ships could be 
maximized through the implementation of a program similar to the Navy’s “Horizon” 
concept of rotating crews.  The forward basing of a SAG and/or other smaller shallow 
draft ships would allow for an even more efficient use of a blue/gold/silver67 crew 
rotation through Guam or the continental United States.  The central location of the 
Philippines will allow for increased patrol times on station.  The elimination of the transit 
time across the Pacific will conserve fuel and reduce the wear and tear on the ship.  The 
facilities in Subic Bay will provide a secure and cost effective means for routine 
maintenance and minor ship repairs.  Major overhauls and repairs can be completed in 
other U.S. shipyards stateside on a rotational basis.68 
C. A PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE ON SUBIC BAY RE-CONVERSION 
Since the United States departed the Philippines in 1992, relations between the 
two countries have improved significantly.  The Philippine government has strongly 
supported the U.S. led “War on Terrorism.”  Former Philippine Presidents, Fidel Ramos 
and Joseph Estrada, the current President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and government 
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officials have long advocated a U.S. Naval presence in the Philippines and acknowledged 
the importance of the mutual defense treaty and VFA with the United States.  They have 
done this despite vocal nationalistic opposition and left leaning politicians.69  This 
Philippine government’s support for a U.S. military presence stems from the realization 
that Manila faces significant regional and domestic security challenges.  While political 
opposition to the return of the U.S. Navy to Subic Bay may be deep rooted, it is more 
than compensated for by the advantages of a U.S. naval presence for both the Philippines 
and the United States.  In light of the increased working relationship between the United 
States and the Philippines, Washington will have to be more up front to quell the 
nationalistic rhetoric and be more transparent with its intentions and actual use of 
facilities in Subic Bay or elsewhere in the Philippines.70 
In 1991, a strong nationalist opposition led the Philippine Senate to reject a ten-
year extension of the U.S. lease on Subic Bay.  But, by 1992, as American forces 
prepared to surrender Subic Bay to the Philippine government, President Ramos had 
initiated a new round of negotiations under the terms of a proposed arrangement called 
the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ASCA).71  The nationalists objected to 
the large U.S. presence, an agreement that disadvantaged the Philippines financially, 
posed a challenge to Philippine sovereignty, and resurrected bad memories of 
colonialism.72  When U.S. military officials at the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board 
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72 Schirmer, Daniel B., “Part 1: The Origins of ACSA,” U.S. Bases by Another Name: ACSA in the 
Philippines, FEB 1995; accessed on 10 NOV 01;available on 
signed the ACSA, they argued that this was an executive agreement and not a treaty.  
Nationalists, however, were outraged, charging that the manner in which the ACSA had 
been negotiated violated the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which required the Senate to 
ratify agreements with foreign powers.  The Philippine Senate agreed and killed the 
ACSA. 
What Ramos could not achieve during his administration, President Estrada 
accomplished during his short-lived presidency (1998-2001), despite the fact that as a 
Senator, Estrada had led the fight to reject the negotiated 1991 base agreement.73  In 
1997, when the ACSA proposal was revived, under the name of the Visiting Forces 
Agreement, there was a heated debate again between nationalists and proponents of the 
new proposal.  Nationalist bitterness toward the agreement received wide media 
coverage.  The issue was defined as a fight between those who were “anti-VFA and pro-
people” or “Pro-VFA and anti-people.”74  Nevertheless there was also a great deal of 
popular support for ratification of the VFA.  For instance, leaders from the southern 
island of Mindanao passed resolutions in favor of the agreement.75  Despite the vocal 
nationalist campaign to pressure government officials, the Philippine Senate voted in 
favor of the VFA in January 1998.  In September 2001, the Philippine government 
granted the United States full access to its ports and airfields to assist the U.S.-led 
campaign against terrorism. 
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Despite an initial cooling off of relations following the withdrawal of American 
forces, the United States remained a mutual defense treaty partner and the largest trading 
partner of the Philippines.76  Nevertheless, efforts to revive the Philippine economy have 
been unsuccessful, so that the Philippines have yet to recover from the years of economic 
plunder during Marcos’ rule.  The Base Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) 
devised by the Philippine government to transform the former naval base into the Subic 
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) or Freeport Zone has failed to live up to 
expectations.  The dream in 1992 was that the SBMA would attract foreign investors and 
so become the next economic boomtown.  Yet, the SBMA has been more of a bust.  The 
weak Philippine economy and consequent lack of funds has delayed the implementation 
of a fifteen-year force modernization program that began in 1993.  Therefore, the AFP, 
unable to acquire new equipment or maintain its current inventory remains in a delicate 
state of readiness and in severe need of modernization. 
Philippine security concerns consist of both external and internal challenges.  The 
major threat externally lies in the disputed claims with the Chinese over portions of the 
Spratley Islands.  The Chinese have advanced what they contend are historic claims in 
the South China Sea including islands within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone.  
To reinforce its claims, Beijing has set up military outposts on Mischief Reef.77  There 
have been some efforts by ASEAN and those nations with competing claims in the South 
China Sea to work out a diplomatic solution.  But negotiations have been met little 
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success.  An agreement between China and the Philippines hammered out during a state 
visit to Beijing by then President Estrada in 2000, is questionable because the Philippines 
was in no position to bargain while in search of greater economic cooperation to aid its 
ailing economy and the weak state of the AFP to enforce its claims in the South China 
Sea.  The future of relations between the Philippines and the PRC are hinged on the 
settlement of the dispute over the Chinese outposts on Mischief Reef and the direction 
ASEAN takes in its approach to relations with China.  President Arroyo stated in July 
2001 that the Philippines would work through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
channels to solve the dispute between the two countries.78 
A more pressing internal security challenge that has consumed almost the entire 
effort of the AFP is the terrorist movement in the Southern Philippines.  Islamic 
separatists groups are attempting to break from the country and create an independent 
state (see Chapter 3).  The AFP has been embarrassed since 1995 by their inability to stop 
the most radical Islamic group, the Abu Sayyaf, that operates on several islands in the 
south.  This insurrection has added to the Philippines’ reputation for instability and 
damaged prospects for foreign investment, further weakening economic reform plans.79 
Given the Philippines’ weak economy and crumbling security situation, it is 
hardly surprising that President Arroyo and others in the Philippine government have 
stated that the military alliance and defense treaty with the United States is a “pillar in our 
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national security and defense.”80  Although the Arroyo administration strongly supports 
the U.S./Philippine security relationship, it is not advocating a return of American 
bases.81  While it is doubtful that Washington wishes to rescue Manila’s ailing economy, 
nor take on its internal or external quarrels, the September 11th attacks nevertheless have 
drawn the United States and the Philippines closer together.  Manila sees the events of 11 
September as an opportunity to build a relationship based on a regional economic 
objective rather than just one based on inequality and dependency.  This was evident 
during the November 20th, 2001 state visit by President Arroyo to the United States.82  
Increased, mature political and military-to-military relations will help foster new ties and 
diminish perceptions of the resurrection of a neo-colonial relationship, an anathema to 
Philippine nationalists.  These political changes pave the way for a greater role played by 
the Philippines in the future of U.S. Naval forward presence.  If time does not heal all 
wounds and foster an atmosphere that welcomes a renewed presence by the U.S. Navy, 
then maybe the overriding security concerns, internally and externally, together with the 
inability of the AFP to confront these issues, will create a more accepting attitude in the 
Philippines.  But in Washington’s eyes, the Spratley Islands are not Taiwan, nor is the 
Abu Sayyaf, al Quaeda.  Any perceived deception by Manila about the American 
commitment to Philippine security concerns may yet prove to be the Achilles heel of the 
new rapprochement between the United States and the Philippines. 
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D. ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS 
The resurrection of Subic Bay as a base for U.S. Naval forward deployment 
certainly has its drawbacks and shortcomings.  However, many of these are diminished 
when one considers the alternative basing options. 
1. Guam 
The base closest to the Southeast Asian region that must be considered the best 
alternative to Subic Bay is the U.S. territory of Guam.  This island was ceded to the 
United States at the same time as the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War 
in 1898.  Guam has been hailed as “the crossroads of the Pacific,” and the place “where 
America’s day begins.”83  Because it is a United States territory, Guam offers the navy all 
the advantage of a forward deployed base without the inconvenience of having to deal 
with a foreign government.  Guamanian Governor Carl Gutierrez and Representative 
Robert Underwood express overwhelming support for an increased presence of naval 
forces in Guam.84  Amenities available in Guam include a deep-water port with pierside 
berths for deep-draft ships (Apra harbor), that include ship repair facilities (the former 
Navy ship repair facility), a large airfield (Anderson AFB), and sizeable fuel storage 
services at the harbor and airfield.  Also in the vicinity of Guam, the Farallon De 
Medinilla target range and the island of Tinian offer fleet exercise areas available for 
training in anti-submarine warfare, naval surface fire support, aerial gunnery, amphibious 
warfare, and expeditionary-airfield operations.85  The navy has set in motion plans to 
relocate and homeport three submarines in Guam.  The first two are expected to arrive in 
April 2002, and the third in 2004. 
While Guam does have its advantages, it also counts its share of drawbacks.  
Some of the downsides to Guam as an expanded base include its distance from Southeast 
Asia, which is approximately 1,200 nautical miles (NM) east of the Philippines.  Nor is 
Guam free of political opposition.  For instance, in January 2001, an activist group filed 
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suit against the use of the live fire exercise areas on Farallon De Medinilla Island.86  
Although the ship repair facility in Guam does provide adequate support, it is neither 
manned nor equipped to handle required maintenance of forward deployed ships.  The 
requirement to bring these ship facilities up to standard would be costly for the navy.87  
Nor could the infrastructure necessary to support a forward deployed presence be built 
overnight.  Guam could certainly be reinforced in such a way as to supplement and 
support Subic Bay.  But it is unlikely that it could supplement it altogether.  The optimal 
situation would be a burden-sharing situation between the two sites. 
2. Australia 
Australia is a strong ally and supporter of U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific 
region, with an excellent military-to-military relationship with the United States. At a 
ministerial meeting in Canberra in July 2001, American and Australian ministerial 
officials discussed the idea for greater security cooperation between the United States and 
its principal allies, Australia, Japan, and South Korea.  These proposals have caused some 
analysts to label Australia as Washington’s “deputy sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific region.88  
But Australia does not see itself in this role, because it is working to enhance its position 
by cooperating with those countries in the region whose interests are compatible with its 
own.  Nevertheless, the U.S.-Australian alliance within ANZUS is an important 
relationship that enhances the overall security in Southeast Asia. 
The U.S. Navy continually makes port calls and conducts training exercises in 
various places throughout Australia.  However, Australia is located too far south to 
effectively support U.S. Naval forward presence in the Western Pacific.  Furthermore, the 
restrictive waters through the Torres Straits between Northern Australia and Papua New 
Guinea are inaccessible to deep draft ships.  This means that aircraft carriers must pass 
south of the massive continent between Sydney and Perth in order to transit between the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
                                                 
86 Fargo, op. cit. 
87 Brown, op. cit., p 8. 




A very strong supporter of the United States’ active participation in the regional 
security of Southeast Asia, Singapore has been very hospitable in giving access to the 
United States forces.  In 1990, the United States and Singapore signed an Access 
Memorandum of Understanding providing a place to host U.S. Naval presence in the 
region.89  Since 1992, Singapore has become home to Commander, Logistics Group 
Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC).  The U.S. Naval Regional Contracting Center, 
also located in Singapore, is responsible for coordinating repairs and for the procurement 
and resupply of ships and aircraft operating with the U.S. Fifth and Seventh Fleets, as 
well as coordinating bilateral exercises in the region.90  In March 2001, Singapore opened 
a new naval base and pier facility that will accommodate and increase accessibility for 
U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and other large vessels.  While Singapore is in a prime 
location at the tip of the Malayan Peninsula, at the crossroads to the Pacific and the 
Indian Oceans, it is restricted by its size and therefore puts limits on an increased use by 
the navy.  It is also positioned in an area where Muslim fundamentalists may find bases 
from which to carry out terrorist attacks on U.S. ships. 
4. Thailand 
Thailand is the United States’ only defense treaty partner that is located on 
Southeast Asian mainland.  Thailand also plays host to one of the largest multilateral 
exercises in the Asia-Pacific region.91  Access to ports and facilities in Thailand have 
afforded the U.S. Navy important refueling, transit, and rest and relaxation 
arrangements.92  The ports routinely used by the U.S. Navy located in Pattaya and Phuket 
have either inadequate berthing facilities or none at all.  Moreover, the Thai government 
has denied the United States permission to preposition ships in its ports because of 
reluctance by the United States to help Thailand get over the 1997 financial crisis.93  In 
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addition, the geography of Thailand and the location of these ports come with their own 
drawbacks (see Figure 2).  Pattaya is located in the extreme northern part of the Gulf of 
Thailand well outside of the shipping lanes that traverse the region.  The small island of 
Phuket, positioned on the west coast of Thailand in the Andaman Sea, is only suitable for 
liberty parties of up to 3,000 personnel.  Therefore, large ships such as aircraft carriers do 
not make port calls in Phuket.  Pierside berths are also limited and normally not 
accessible to U.S. ships.94  Neither location in Thailand is considered suitable as a 
typhoon haven as both offer only exposed anchorages to wind and waves.  For this 
reason, ships would have to set out to sea if they needed to ride out a heavy storm. 
 
Figure 2. Location of ports in Thailand 
Source: GlobalSecurity.org website 
<http://globalsecurity.org/military/facility/images/Pattaya.html>. 
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5. Malaysia 
Malaysia in the past several years has opened its ports to the U.S. Navy and 
progress has been made to improve relations with a view of supporting a U.S. presence in 
the region.  But, while most Southeast Asian leaders have backed the U.S.-led “War on 
Terrorism,” Malaysia has set itself apart from the rest of its fellow ASEAN members in 
pushing for a halt in U.S. strikes in Afghanistan.95  Unfortunately, terrorist networks are 
known to have ties to Malaysia.96  Port Kelang is located on the west coast of Malaysia, 
astride the western opening of the Strait of Malacca, offering the only other location 
currently accessible to U.S. aircraft carriers.  Port Kelang is a major commercial port in 
Malaysia that offers a good staging area for any operations in the Indian Ocean.  
However, it does not provide a good strategic location for a quick reaction to support 
operations in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.  Nor would adequate guarantees of 
force protection be available there. 
6. Vietnam 
Although Vietnam is one of a few countries that still remain under communist 
rule, it has been in a period of significant transformation since the mid-1980s.  Over the 
last decade, the United States and Vietnam have begun to normalize relations on a broad 
range of issues.  This paved the way for President Clinton’s historic visit to Vietnam in 
November 2000, the first by an American president in almost 30 years.  Although the 
interaction between the two countries remains circumscribed, they have opened the door 
and laid the foundation for cooperation in business, technology, and education ventures.  
Initial negotiations concerning U.S.-Vietnamese military relations have made little 
progress, however.  The Vietnamese military has been invited to be an observer to 
multilateral exercises in an attempt to draw them into regional security arrangements.  
The most probable type of military interaction with Vietnam in the short term would 
more likely be a naval one, such as ship visits and exercises. 
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Vietnam became a member of ASEAN in 1995 and is, as of November 2001, the 
head of the ARF (2000-2001).  The Vietnamese have been Russia’s continued link to the 
Southeast Asian region and ASEAN.  In 2001, the Vietnamese government announced 
that it would not extend Russia’s lease on Cam Ranh Bay when it expires in 2004.  The 
declining state of the Russian Navy means that the Russian exodus was more likely the 
result of a mutual agreement.  Vietnam intends to transform Cam Ranh Bay into an 
economic center.97  Of course, the question of a new U.S. naval presence in Vietnam is 
likely to be a sensitive issue for both countries.  An agreement for a more permanent use 
of facilities there is unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future.  The two countries 
must first get over the initial hurdle of closer military relations before any talk of setting 
up shop proceeds.  This option definitely lies in the distant future, and not in the next 
five-to-ten years. 
7. Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) 
Since 1996, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has examined the MOB concept 
as one option to alleviate the strategic and political obstacles to identifying and securing 
bases overseas.  The MOB concept envisions a series of adjoined, semi-submersible, 
modular floating bases that will be able to deploy to any area of U.S. national interest 
around the world.  It will be able to provide U.S. and allied forces with a means to 
provide air support, the ability to dock cargo ships, adequate space for maintenance and 
storage of equipment, materials, and fuel, and the accommodation of up to 3,000 transient 
personnel, in addition to the crew of the MOB.  Size and functions of the MOB platform 
make it incomparable to any other floating structure ever built.  It must reach a length 
approaching 6,000 feet in order to accommodate a runway.  One of the 305-meter long 
platforms will displace approximately 300,000 metric tons. (See Figure 3) 
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Figure 3. One of the Alternative Concepts of the MOB. 
Source: Mobile Offshore Base website < http://mob.nfesc.navy.mil>. 
 
The ONR team states that it is feasible to build a platform of this size and meet all 
of its design goals.  While ships such as CV(N)s and large deck amphibious ships can 
handle Verticle/Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft such as the Harrier jet, the 
overriding issue is whether or not a platform can meet the needs of landings and take offs 
of larger Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) aircraft.  But doubts remain about 
the feasibility of the MOB as an engineering concept.  The cost of the MOB is also a 
concern, with estimates from the four concept designers ranging from 5 to 10 billion 
dollars for a complete MOB platform.  Other estimates set the cost of a single module at 
approximately 1.5 billion dollars.98  Proponents of the MOB justify the costs by 
comparing it with the smaller capacities of current CV(N)s and large deck amphibious 
                                                 
98 Zueck, Robert, Robert Taylor, and Paul Palo, “Development Options for Mobile Offshore Base 
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ships.  These ships possess only one-quarter the of the storage space that a MOB can 
provide.  Nor do they have the ability to land large aircraft.   
All of these comparisons of relative capacity are true.  But the MOB is far less 
mobile than a carrier.  For instance, operations against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, a 
land locked country, have been overcome with aircraft carriers serving in more than one 
role.  The enormous size of the MOB is only one drawback.  The operating costs and the 
large number of personnel needed to maintain the MOB pose significant problems.  Much 
of the advertised storage space in the MOB would be needed just to sustain the crew 
itself.  The MOB will be underway constantly and constitute greater manning 
requirements in an era when most ships are experiencing a shortage of manning and 
gapping many critical billets.  Until these problems can be resolved, too many roadblocks 
continue to exist for the MOB to prove operationally feasible in the near future. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the focus of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region increases, secure U.S. 
Naval facilities will be in demand to guarantee access to the region.  The Philippines 
provides the best strategic location for U.S. Naval facilities in the Asia-Pacific region that 
offer both access to the region as well as suitable force protection.  The advantages of 
creating Naval facilities in the Philippines far outweigh the negatives for both countries 
and the Asia-Pacific region.   
This thesis has also stressed that U.S. Naval forward presence has been and 
continues to be widely accepted as a vital element in protecting the national interests of 
the United States in the complex Asia-Pacific region.  The Asia-Pacific region is a 
multifaceted geographic, political and security environment.  Geographically, the region 
spans a great distance that covers more than half of the earth’s surface, one that links the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Middle East with the Far East and Southeast Asia.  It 
is within this region that a vast amount of the world’s trade flows via important sea-lanes 
of communication.  Politically, the United States military, in particular the U.S. Navy, is 
seen as the stabilizing factor in the region, because it continues to maintain an active 
presence there.  Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific remains a region of great volatility.  The 
U.S. Navy offers one of the most effective and efficient ways to project a forward 
military presence.  U.S. Naval forward presence provides the flexibility and an array of 
operational possibilities best adapted to this geographically and politically complex 
region. 
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Specific U.S. interests are rooted in the prevention of war and the maintenance of 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region.  A forward deployed overseas presence is a key 
component of existing U.S. strategy and is a determining factor in the size of certain U.S. 
forces.  From the time the United States obtained possession of the Philippines in 1898, 
through the Cold War, the United States has relied on overseas presence as a means of 
containing the threat of Japanese, and later of communist, expansion.  At the end of the 
Cold War, a combination of the United States “drawdown” and Philippine nationalism 
caused the United States to withdrawal from the Subic Bay.  Now, it is clearly time to 
consider a return of the U.S. Navy to Subic, because the security and political situation 
has changed for both the United States and the Philippines.  The increasing assertiveness 
of the People’s Republic of China and the threat of terrorism are a worry to both 
countries.  These worries have combined to calm the strident nationalism that drove U.S. 
forces from the Philippines a decade ago. 
It is crucial that the U.S. Navy has assured access to secure port facilities from 
which to stage forces and provide logistical support to an operation.  Subic Bay is clearly 
the best option available to the U.S. Navy, both geographically and politically.  By 
continuing to rely solely on port access agreements, the United States is vulnerable to 
countries that may deny the U.S. Navy access to, and utilization of, its ports in times of 
crisis.  A country may feel threatened by a nearby regional aggressor, or from terrorists, 
were to allow the United States to conduct operations from its ports.  The Philippine 
Islands have a strategic advantage because they do not share borders with a potential 
aggressor.  Washington and Manila are agreed on the need to stand up to Beijing’s more 
expansionist demands, and on the requirement to oppose terrorism.  Furthermore, Subic 
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Bay offers a relatively secure base from which to operate.  The USS Cole incident in an 
unsecured port should stand as an example of how terrorists and disaster can strike in 
places with inadequate force protection. 
However, there are drawbacks to positioning naval forces in the Philippines.  The 
re-emergence of a presence from the United States may resurrect deep-rooted Philippine 
nationalist sentiment that has been so prominent in the past.  Therefore, it is essential that 
any agreement to place U.S. Naval force in the Philippines should both guarantee a stable 
presence for U.S. Naval forces, while also taking note of Philippine national sensibilities.  
Moving to establish a U.S. Naval facility in the Philippines, or anywhere else for that 
matter, is not going to happen in the immediate future.  It will take some time to create 
and foster a mutual relationship to make possible an agreement for U.S. facilities to the 
Philippines.  The approval of the Visiting Forces Agreement and the execution of 
successful bilateral training exercises prove that a U.S.-Philippine partnership can be 
fruitful for both countries.  The U.S. Naval presence will create economic growth in the 
Philippines, and it will enhance militarily the Navy’s forward basing in an economically 
viable fashion. 
The Bush Administration currently is engaged in developing new strategies for 
homeland defense, and continuing a military campaign to retaliate against the terrorist 
groups responsible for the September 11th 2001 attacks against the United States.  This 
will assuredly further increase the operational tempo of the U.S. Navy.  With the rise of 
Chinese power and influence in the Pacific, the fight against terrorism, and general 
regional instability, new innovative ways of maintaining a forward Naval presence are 
vital to ensure American regional and global interests.  This argument to establish a 
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secure naval facility in the Philippines offers one solution to the changing role of the U.S. 




AFB    Air Force Base 
AFP    Armed Forces of the Philippines 
ARF    ASEAN Regional Forum 
ANZUS   Australia-New Zealand-United States defense treaty 
ASCA    Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
ASEAN   Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CENTCOM   Central Command 
CIA    Central Intelligence Agency 
COMLOGWESTPAC Commander, Logistics Western Pacific 
CTOL    Conventional Takeoff and Landing 
CV(N)    Aircraft Carrier 
CVBG    Aircraft Carrier Battle Group 
DMZ    Demilitarized Zone 
DPRK    Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
FY    Fiscal Year 
MBA    Military Bases Agreement 
MNLF    Moro National Liberation Front 
MOB    Mobile Offshore Base 
MOOTW   Military Operations Other Than War 
NAS    Naval Air Station 
NM    Nautical Mile 
OPTEMPO   Operational tempo 
ONR    Office of Naval Research 
PACOM   Pacific Command 
PRC    People’s Republic of China 
QDR     Quadrennial Defense Report 
ROC    Republic of China 
SAG    Surface Action Group 
SBMA    Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority 
SCO    Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SLOC    Sea-Lanes of Communication 
TRA    Taiwan Relations Act 
WMD    Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WW II    World War II 
USCINCPAC   Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Forces 
VFA    Visiting Forces Agreement 
VSTOL   Vertical/Standing Takeoff and Landing 
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